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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 78-2-2(3) (j)
UCA (1989).
The nature of the proceeding is an appeal from a final order
and a final judgment of the District Court deciding that treble
damages should not be awarded.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented by the appeal are whether or not treble
damages

should be awarded

Detainer statute.
trial

court

to

pursuant to the Forcible Entry

and

The standard of review is the refusal of the
give

effect

to

the

waiver

of

objection

to

insufficiency of process provided in Rules 12(b) and (h) URCP.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Annotated, 38-8-3 SELF-SERVICE STORAGE FACILITIES:
38-8-3.
Enforcement of lien - Notice requirements - Sale
procedure and effect.
A claim of an owner which has become due against an
occupant and which is secured by the owner's lien may be
satisfied as follows:
(1) No enforcement action may be taken by the owner
until the occupant has been in default continuously for
a period of 30 days.
(2) After the occupant has been in default
continuously for a period of 3 0 days, the owner may begin
enforcement action if the occupant has been given notice
in writing. The notice shall be delivered in person or
sent by certified mail to the last known address of the
occupant, and a copy of the notice shall, at the same
time, be sent to the sheriff of the county where the
self-service storage facility is located.
Any lien
holder with an interest in the property to be sold or
otherwise disposed of, of whom the owner has knowledge
either through the disclosure provision on the rental
agreement or through the existence of a validly filed and
perfected UCC-1 financing statement with the Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code, or through other
written notification, shall be included in the notice
process as set forth in this section.
(3) This notice shall include:
(a) an itemized statement of the owner's claim
showing the sum due at the time of the notice and
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the date when the sum became due;
(b) a brief and general description of the
personal property subject to the lien, which
description shall be reasonably adequate to permit
the person notified to identify the property; except
that any container including, but not limited to,
a trunk, valise, or box that is locked, fastened,
sealed, or tied in a manner which deters immediate
access to its contents may be described as such
without describing its contents;
(c) a notification of denial of access to the
personal property, if such denial is permitted under
the
terms
of
the
rental
agreement,
which
notification shall provide the name, street address,
and telephone number of the owner or his designated
agent whom the occupant may contact to respond to
the notification;
(d) a demand for payment within a specified
time not less than 15 days after delivery of the
notice; and
(e) a conspicuous statement that, unless the
claim is paid within the time stated in the notice,
the personal property will be advertised for sale
or other disposition and will be sold or otherwise
disposed of at a specified time and place.
(4) Any notice made under this section shall be
presumed delivered when it is deposited with the United
States postal service and properly addressed with postage
prepaid.
(5) (a) After the expiration of the time given in
the notice, an advertisement of the sale or
other disposition shall be published once a
week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the county where the
self-service storage facility is located. The
advertisement shall include:
(i) a brief and general description of the
personal property reasonably adequate to
permit its identification as provided for
in Subsection (3)(b); the address of the
self-service storage facility and the
number, if any, of the space where the
personal property is located; and the name
of the occupant and his last known
address; and
(ii) the time, place, and manner of the
sale or other disposition shall take place
not sooner than 15 days after the first
publication,
(b) If there is no newspaper of general
circulation in the county where the selfservice storage facility is located, the
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advertisement Shall be posted at least ten days
before the date of the sale or other
disposition in not less than six conspicuous
places in the neighborhood where the selfservice storage facility is located.
(6) Any sale or other disposition of the personal
property shall conform to the terms of the notice
provided for in this section.
(7) Any sale or other disposition of the personal
property shall beheld at the self-service storage
facility or at the nearest suitable place to where the
personal property is held or stored.
(8) Before any sale or other disposition of
personal property under this section, the occupant may
pay the amount necessary to satisfy the lien and the
reasonable expenses incurred under this section and
thereby redeem the personal property; upon receipt of
this payment, the owner shall return the personal
property, and thereafter the owner shall have no
liability to any person with respect to that personal
property.
(9) A purchaser in good faith of the personal
property sold to satisfy a lien as provided for in this
chapter takes the property free of any rights of persons
against whom the lien was valid and free of any rights
of a secured creditor, despite noncompliance by the owner
with the requirements of this section.
(10) In the event of a sale under this section, the
owner may satisfy his lien for the proceeds of the sale,
subject to the rights of any prior lienholder; the lien
rights of the prior lienholder are automatically
transferred to the proceeds of the sale; if the sale is
made in good faith and is conducted in a reasonable
manner, the owner shall not be subject to any surcharge
for a deficiency in the amount of a prior secured lien,
but shall hold the balance, if any, for delivery to the
occupant, lienholder, or other person in interest; if the
occupant, lienholder, or other person in interest does
not claim the balance of the proceeds within one year of
the date of sale, it shall become the property of the
Utah state treasurer as unclaimed property with no
further claim against the owner.
(11) If the requirements of this chapter are not
satisfied, if the sale of the personal property is not
in conformity with the notice of sale, or if there is a
willful violation of this chapter, nothing in this
section affects the rights and liabilities of the owner,
occupant, or any other person.
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Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-2(3)(j) Supreme Court jurisdiction:
78-2-2• Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdition.
Utah Code Annotated, 78-36-1 Forcible Entry and Detainer:
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a
house, or by fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by and kind
of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into
real property, . . .
Utah Code Annotated, 78-36-8 Forcible Entry and Detainer:
78-36-8.
Allegations permitted in complaint - Time for
appearance - Service of summons.
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting
forth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set forth
any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence which may have
accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or
unlawful detainer, and claim damages therefor or compensation
for the occupation of the premises, or both. If the unlawful
detainer charged is after default in the payment of rent, the
complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The court shall
indorse on the summons the number of days within which the
defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which
shall not be less than three or more than 20 days from the
date of service.
The court may authorize service by
publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication
is complete one week after publication. Service by mail is
complete three days after mailing.
The summons shall be
changed in form to conform to the time of service as ordered,
and shall be served as in other cases.
Utah Code Annotated, 78-36-10 Forcible Entry and Detainer:
78-36-10.
Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent Immediate enforcement - Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon
default. A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall
include an order for the restitution of the premises. If the
proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure
to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement
under which the property is held, or after default in the
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the
forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
-4-

(2) The iurv or the court, if the proceeding is tried
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also
assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the
following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's
tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved
at trial; and
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful
detainer is after default in the payment of rent,
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant
for the rent, for three times the amount of the damages
assessed under Subsection (2)(a)
through (2^ fc), and for
reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in the
lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon the
judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the
judgment*
In all cases, the judgment may be issued and
enforced immediately. (Emphasis added).
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1:
Rule 1. General provisions.
(a) Scope of rules.
These rules shall govern the
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, the
circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of Utah
in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature,
whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special
statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules
promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and
except as stated in Rule 81.
They shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on
January 1, 1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith
shall be of no further force or effect.
They govern all
proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the
extent that in the opinion of the court their application in
a particular action pending when the rules take effect would
not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the
former procedure applies.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b) and (h):
Rule 12. Defenses and Objections
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to
claim for relief in any pleading. whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is

-5-

required, except that the following defenses may at the option
of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5)
insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join
an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is
permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion or by further pleadings after the denial
of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve
a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense
in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and
objections which he does not present either bv motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to
join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to
state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2)
that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or
defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may
have been received. (Emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant owned

a storage unit which he rented to

Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs stored furniture and equipment in the unit
and placed a lock thereon.

Defendant, without authority from

Plaintiffs, broke the lock and sold the contents to a third party.
Plaintiffs brought an action to recover the items or, in lieu
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thereof, to recover damages and later amended the complaint
alleging, among other claims, a claim for Forcible Entry and
Detainer.

Defendant

allegations.

answered, generally

denying

Plaintiffs1

Defendant failed to allege any defense based on

insufficiency of process.

The jury by special verdict determined

Plaintiffs' damages to be $7,000.

Plaintiffs moved to have the

damages trebled pursuant to the Forcible Entry and
statute.

Detainer

The court ruled that Plaintiffs were not entitled to

treble damages because Plaintiffs did not have an endorsement by
the court upon the summons stating the number of days within which
the Defendant shall be required to appear and defend the action,
which shall not be less than three or more than twenty days from
date of service, as provided by 78-36-8 UCA 1953 and therefor the
action cannot be deemed to be an action under the Forcible Entry
and Detainer statute.
Plaintiffs

assert

that

under

Rule

12(b)

and

(h)

that

insufficiency of process is an affirmative defense which was waived
by the Defendant by failure to assert that defense. The issue for
review is whether or not the court erred in ruling that the
Defendant had not waived his right to assert the insufficiency of
process pursuant to Rule 12(b) and (h) and in ruling that the
$7,000 verdict should not be trebled.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs stored household furnishings in a storage unit
owned by Defendant.

Defendant admitted in paragraph 15 of his

answer:
-7-

Defendants removed or caused to be removed all
of Plaintiffs1 property that was stored in the
storage unit without any notice or claim under
the provisions of Exhibit A or as required by
the Utah Self Storage Facilities Act . . . as
then in effect.
The jury in a special verdict determined that Plaintiffs1
damage from the unlawful entry was in the amount of $7,000 based
upon the value of the items taken by Defendant. The court refused
to treble that amount upon the premise that in order to have an
unlawful detainer action, there must be an endorsement upon the
summons setting forth the time for answer, which had not been done.
The original complaint was not one in unlawful detainer. The
complaint

alleged

negligence, breach

warranty and breach of fiduciary duty.

of

contract, breach

of

Defendant was served with

a usual twenty-day summons.

Defendant failed to answer and a

default judgment was entered.

Defendant than moved to set aside

the default judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect.
judgment was set aside.

The

Plaintiffs then amended their complaint

to add several causes of action including an action in forcible
entry

seeking

complaint).

treble

damages

(paragraph

28

of

the

amended

Defendant simply denied said allegations (paragraph

25 of his answer).

Defendant, by his answer, raised no issue as

to the sufficiency of process.
Plaintiffs asserted that by failing to present the defense of
insufficiency of process either by motion or in his answer he had
waived said defense as provided in Rule 12(b) and (h) URCP.
court refused to so rule.
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The

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
78-36-10 UCA provides that judgment shall be entered against
the Defendant for three times the amount of damages assessed by the
jury in the event of unlawful entry.

The entry was unlawful.

It

violated the terms of the storage agreement and of the Utah Self
Storage Facilities Act because the entry was without notice and
because of the violence in cutting the lock to gain entry.
The forcible entry and detainer statute applies to commercial
buildings as well as to residences.
The damages resulting from forcible entry include the value
of household goods and personal effects removed.
Trebling is mandatory.
Defendant failed to set forth any objection to the sufficiency
of process by motion or in his answer.

By failing to do so and by

going to trial, he has waived that defense pursuant to Rules 12(b)
and (h) URCP.
ARGUMENT
Unlawful Entry
Defendant admitted in paragraph 15 of his answer that he
entered Plaintiffs' storage unit and removed their possessions
without any required notice.

He stated:

Defendants removed or caused to be removed all
of Plaintiffs1 property that was stored in the
storage unit without any notice or claim under
the provisions of Exhibit A or as required by
the Utah Self Storage Facilities Act . . . as
then in effect.
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The Exhibit "A" referred to above with which Defendant admits
he did not comply is the rental agreement, Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 1.
It provides when the Defendant may remove the lock*

It states:

Occupant or Owner may terminate the Occupancy created by
this Rental Agreement by delivering written notice to the
other party of its intention to do so at least 15 days
prior to the last day of the calendar month in which
Occupancy will terminate.
Any property left In the
Storage Space after the date for which Occupant (sic) has
given notice to terminate will be deemed abandoned bv the
Occupant, After said date. Owner may remove any lock
from the Storage Space and dispose of the contents
thereof without notice or liability to the Occupant.
Defendants therefore violated the provisions of the rental
agreement, as well as the provisions of the Self Storage Act.
The court recognized the wrongful entry in its Instruction
Number 16, which states:
Defendant's acts in cutting or causing to be cut Plaintiffs1 lock on the door and removing all items of personal property of Plaintiffs were wrongful.
Forcible Entry
The acts of Defendant in cutting Plaintiffs1 lock and entering
their storage unit constituted forcible entry.

78-36-1 defines

forcible entry as follows:
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts
of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by
any kind of violence or circumstances of terror, enters
upon or into any real property; . . .
Violence
In Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100, 103, 104, (Utah 1944) the
Utah Court, in considering an action for damages, construed the
forcible entry provision.

The court stated:
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Under our statute any entry bv force is prohibited.
Being prohibited, such entry was wrongful and the
aggrieved party has his remedy.
The Forcible Entry
Statute expressed a policy that no person should enter
by force, stealth, fraud or intimidation, premises of
which another had peaceable possession. . .
It is contended by the appellant that this was not
an entry by "force" within the meaning of the statute.
The Utah Act was copied from the California Code of Civil
Procedure, Section 1159. In Winchester v. Becker, 4
Cal.App. 382, 88 P. 296, 297, the defendant had entered
the premises by means of a key on two different occasions
while the plaintiff was absent. The court, construing
the California Act, stated in holding that there had been
a forcible entry:
"The question is presented whether the defendant's
entry made in the manner stated comes within the
provisions of the first subdivision of section 1159 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, by which every person is to
be held to be guilty of a forcible entry who 'by breaking
open doors, windows, or other parts of a house * * *
enters upon or into any real property.f This question
we think must be answered in the affirmative.
The
meaning of the provision is that any * * * force is to
be regarded as fbreaking open' the door or window or
house.
This was the construction given to the term
'break' as entering into the common-law definition of
burglary, and we see no reason why a different construction should be given to it in the provision now under
consideration."
Here it is alleged that the defendant entered upon
the premises in plaintiff's absence by unlocking the
doors and removing the doors from their hinges. Under
the authorities construing acts similar to the Utah Act,
and under the acts similar to the Utah Act, and under
the Utah statutes making it a forcible entry to enter by
stealth, these facts sufficiently show a forcible entry.
discussing the requisite force in order to come under the
Entry Statutes, it is stated in 21 Proof of Facts 2d §

Forcible entry is that made with actual physical
force directed against the premises. . .
21 POF 2d § 607 f 2
Perhaps the clearest indication of a forcible entry,
or of a forcible detainer following a peaceable entry,
-11-

is a showing of some physical damage to the persons or
premises resulting from the entry or detainer. Where the
property in question is enclosed by a fence or other
barrier, it has been held that the breaking of such a
barrier and the entry onto the property will constitute
a forcible entry, regardless of whether there has been
any further violence or threatened breach of the public
peace.
21 POF 2d § 607 J 3
With even less force, where the defendant entered the property
with the aid of a locksmith and changed all the locks on the
building, it has been held that there was a forcible entry, even
though there was no damage to the building.

Karp v. Marcrolis, 323

P.2d 557 (Cal.App. 1958); Jordan v.' Talbot, 361 P.2d 20 (Cal.1961).
Commercial Building
Although a frequent application of the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Statute involves residential leases, the express language
of 78-36-1 makes it applicable to "any real property".
The extension of the act to any real property was clearly
recognized in the early Utah case of Eccles v. Union Pacific Coal
Company. 48 P. 148 (Utah 1897), which involved fenced land.
The California Court has held that the California Act upon
which the Utah Act was based applies to forcible entry to a commercial building.

The court held that where owners of certain

premises entered such premises, which were in possession of plaintiffs, without legal process with the help of a locksmith, while
plaintiffs were not physically in the building, and thereafter
retained physical possession of the building, they were guilty of
forcible entry, even though the building was a commercial building,
and even though there was no violence or circumstances of terror.
-12-

In Karp v. Maraolis. 323 P.2d 557, 559 (Cal.App. 1958).

The court

stated:
Defendants break Subdivision 1 of Section 1159 into
two parts, reading it as if it applied to two kinds of
structures, the first to a house, and the second to any
other kind of building. They liken the word "house" to
home, and say as the place entered is admittedly a commercial building, there was no forcible entry because
there was no "breaking open doors, windows, or other
parts of a house". The argument is not without some
logical basis, and may be a reasonable interpretation of
the section. However, courts have always before now read
this section as a whole without making any division of
affected subjects as suggested by defendants. In each
of the following cases there was no "breaking open doors,
windows, or other parts", each involved a commercial
building and forcible entry was found to exist in each
instance. San Francisco & Suburban Home Bldg. Soc. v.
Leonard, 17 Cal.App. 254, 119 P. 405 (business office);
Rutledge v. Barger, 82 Cal.App. 356, 255 P. 537 (store
building); Pacific States Auxiliary Corp. v. Farris, 118
Cal.App. 522, 5 P.2d 452 (apartment house); Calidino
Hotel Co. of San Bernardino v. Bank of America, etc., 31
Cal.App. 2d 295, 87 P. 2d 923 (hotel) and Pickens v.
Johnson, 107 Cal.App.2d 778, 238 P.2d 40 (tavern).
Damages
Damages resulting from forcible entry include the value of
household goods and personal effects removed from the premises.
Black Mountain Corp. v. Jowdv. 268 S.W. 794 (Ky. 1925).

See also

36A CJS Forcible Entry & Detainer § 109.
In the leading Utah case of Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206,
214, (Utah 1930) the court, in determining what should be trebled,
stated:
The Plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages as are
the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful
detainer.
That such is the general rule is stated in 36A C.J.S. Forcible
Entry & Detainer § 109:
•13-

The damages recoverable for wrongful dispossession
of the defendant in a forcible entry and detainer
proceeding are such a sum as will fairly and reasonably
compensate him for the losses he has sustained as a
result of the dispossession.
The natural and proximate consequences of the forcible entry were
the disposal by the Defendant of the contents of the storage unit.
Trebling Is Mandatory
In Eccles v. Union Pacific Coal Company, supra, 48 P. 148,
150 (Utah 1897) , the Utah court long ago held that it was error for
the trial court not to treble damages.

The syllabus by the court

stated:
Appellant obtained judgment against the respondent,
a corporation, for possession, and for damages resulting
from an unlawful and forcible entry and detainer of lands
he had obtained from the United States under the homestead laws; and the respondent still continued the unlawful and forcible detention of the premises after
demand, and for about two years after judgment. In an
action brought by the appellant, under sections 3787 and
3801, Comp. Laws 1888, to recover damages for forcible
and unlawful detention of the lands, subsequent to the
judgment, and for treble damages, as provided for by
statute, the jury found damages for appellant in the sum
of $800. The court, on motion, declined to treble the
damages. Held error, and that the court should have
trebled the damages.
The Eccles court stated:
These damages are to be ascertained, or, in other words,
assessed, by the Jury, or by the court acting without a
jury, according to the truth of case; and, when this is
done, it is made the duty of the court to treble them.
. . . This action was properly brought under section
3787, which deals with the subject of forcible entry and
detainer; and we see no valid reason why the damages
found for forcible detainer should not be trebled by the
court, as provided by the act. Under the authorities,
there seems to be no escape from this result. The plaintiff is entitled to have the damages for forcible and
unlawful detainer trebled by the court, with costs.

-14-

Eccles was cited with approval Forrester v. Cook, supra, 292
P. 206, 214 (Utah 1930), wherein the Utah court stated:
The wording of the statute is "judgment shall be rendered
against the defendant guilty of the forcible entry, or
forcible or unlawful detainer, for the rent and for three
times the amount of the damages thus assessed." This
language has been held to require the entry of judgment
for three times the amount of the damages, after a finding of damages by the jury* Eccles v. Union Pacific Coal
Co.. 15 Utah 14, 48 P. 148. That action was one for
forcible and unlawful detainer, but the statute applies
as well to unlawful detainer. The statute as construed
in Eccles v. U.P. Coal Co.. supra, makes it mandatory
upon the court to render judgment for three times the
amount of damages thus assessed.
These cases were followed in the Utah Court of Appeals
decision in Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Utah
1989), wherein the Court stated it was mandatory to treble the
damages found.
All Elements of Forcible Entry
And Detainer Are Present
The court, in its order of July 12, 1991, stated:
The court recognized the wrongful entry in its
Instimetion Number 16, which states:
Defendant's acts in cutting or causing to
be cut Plaintiffs' lock on the door and
removing all items of personal property
of Plaintiffs were wrongful.
The
court
finds
however
that
because
Plaintiffs did not have an endorsement by the court
upon the summons stating the number of days within
which the Defendant shall be required to appear and
defend the action, which shall not be less than
three or more than twenty days from date of
service, as required by 78-36-8 UCA 1953, that this
cannot be deemed to be an action under the Forcible
Entry and Detainer statute.
The motion
denied.

to treble damages
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is therefor

Plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully to the trial court that
treble damages must be awarded because

Defendant waived

his

objection to the sufficiency of process; because obtaining the
court's endorsement on the summons would have been a useless act;
and because the two cases relied upon by Defendant are not
controlling.
Defendant Waived Any Objection
To The Sufficiency Of Process
The original complaint was not one in unlawful detainer. The
complaint

alleged

negligence, breach

warranty and breach of fiduciary duty.

of

contract, breach

of

Defendant was served with

a usual twenty-day summons.

Defendant failed to answer and a

default judgment was entered.

Defendant then moved to set aside

the default judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect.
judgment was set aside.

The

Plaintiffs then amended their complaint

to add several causes of action including an action in forcible
entry,

seeking

complaint).

treble

damages

(paragraph

28

of

the

amended

Defendant simply denied said allegations (paragraph

25 of his answer) and raised no issue as to the sufficiency of
process.
Rule 12(b) and (h) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide as
follows:
Defenses and Objections
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to
claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the option
of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5)
-16-

insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join
an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is
permitted. . . .
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and
obj ections which he does not present either bv motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his
answer or reply. . .
Rule 1(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no
further force or effect. . .
That provision in Rule 1(b) leaves no doubt that if there is a
conflict between it and the provisions of the unlawful detainer
statute that the Rule prevails.

In fact, however, there is no

conflict because the unlawful detainer provision for endorsement
on the summons is compatible with Rule 1.

All the Defendant had

to do was to raise the objection timely by motion or by answer.
He raised no objection to sufficiency of process until after the
trial and verdict.
Obtaining The Court's Endorsement On The
Summons Would Have Been A Useless Act
The purpose of the statutory provision

for the court's

endorsement on the summons of the time within which Defendant
should plead is to give Plaintiffs the opportunity to have a speedy
remedy.

The court can order that an answer be filed within three

to twenty days under 78-36-8 UCA.

Here Plaintiffs did not seek a

shortening of the usual twenty-day time period and so the full
amount of time was given by the summons. Having the court endorse
a twenty-day time period would have been superfluous.
-17-

A Second Summons Is Not Contemplated By The Rules
The summons issued before the addition of the forcible entry
claim was adequate.
amendment

of

the

Defendant appeared in the action after the
complaint

added

the

forcible

entry

claim.

Issuance of a second summons was uncalled for.
The Two Cases Relied Upon By Defendant
Are Not Controlling
Defendant cites Gerard v. Young, 432 P2d 343 (Utah 1967) and
Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc. , 558 P2d 1317 (Utah
1976), both stating that in a forcible entry and detainer action
there must be an endorsement by the court on the summons of the
time within which to answer.

In neither of those cases was the

issue raised by the parties in either the lower court or the
supreme court of whether or not there must be such an endorsement.
Consequently, in neither case was the waiver of defense provided
by Rule 12 discussed nor was it ruled upon.

This is disclosed by

the briefs on appeal of both parties on file in the supreme court
library, pertinent excerpts of which are attached.
In Gerard, there actually was no pleading even alleging
forcible entry

and detainer.

The complaint was merely

cancellation of lease and for restitution.

for

There was an answer

denying the right of cancellation and restitution. On a motion for
summary judgment, the Defendant argued there were issues of fact
precluding summary judgment.

Notwithstanding the fact that the

action was not one in forcible entry and detainer, the trial court
not only cancelled the lease but determined the amount of damages

-18-

and trebled them.

On appeal the supreme court ruled that there was

an issue of fact as to damages and that any award thereof on a
summary judgment was improper. The supreme court necessarily ruled
that if there was no determination of damage, there of course,
could be no trebling.

Only

as an additional

reason

for

its

decision did the court state that there was no endorsement upon the
summons.
no

one

Not only was this not a forcible entry action, but also
raised

or

considered

the

rule

that

a

defense

of

insufficiency of process was waived pursuant to Rule 12.
In Pinaree, as shown by the briefs of both parties on appeal,
no issue was raised concerning the endorsement on the summons of
the number of days for appearance. The cross-appellant argued that
the trial court's refusal to treble damages was error.

Appellant

argued that the refusal was correct because the notice to vacate
the premises was deficient,
damages had been

shown

the rentals had been paid

for refusal

to vacate.

and no

There was

reference by either party to the sufficiency of process.

no
The

parties, the lower court and the supreme court therefor did not
reach the issue of waiver of defense set forth in Rule 12.

That

defense was not just untimely, it was never raised.
CONCLUSION
Damages must be trebled because:
(a)

All elements of forcible entry and detainer are

present.
(b) The Defendant entered his appearance which does away
with the necessity for any summons and any endorsement thereon.
-19-

(c)

Having the court endorse on the summons that an

answer must be filed within twenty days would have been superfluous
since that was what it already provided.

Shortening of time to

answer was not sought nor obtained.
(d)

By not timely raising the issue, pursuant to Rule

12, Defendant has waived the issue of sufficiency of process.
(e)

The Gerard and Pinaree cases are not controlling,

principally because the issue of waiver was not seen nor raised by
the parties nor the courts.
/y

Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 1991.

c^/^^C^
2-J vZgr-^
John W. Lowe, Attorney for
Nglaintiffs/Appellants
1624 Orchard Drive
P. 0. Box 520003
Salt Lake City, UT 84152-0003
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John W. Lowe, No, 2001
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1624 Orchard Drive
P. 0. Box 520003
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-0003
Telephone:

JUL

2 1991

sy.
L«l-M.> ^.^.

(801) 486-5287
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES N. FOWLER and
SHERRIL FOWLER,
:

ORDER AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT
INTEREST AND DENYING
TREBLE DAMAGES

:

Civil No. 880906180CV

:

Judge John A. Rokich

Plaintiffs,

TERRY R. SEITER,
Defendant.
This matter came on for trial.
the sum of $7,000 as damages.

The jury awarded Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs then moved to have pre-

judgment interest awarded and to treble the $7,000 awarded by the
jury as damages, the trebling to be pursuant to Forcible Entry and
Detainer statute 78-36-10 UCA.
Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in support of their motions.
Defendant filed a memorandum objecting to the motions and Plaintiffs
filed a reply memorandum.

The court considered the memoranda and

filed a minute entry awarding interest at the rate of $1.91 per day
but denying the trebling of damages.
PRIOR ORDERS SET ASIDE
IT IS ORDERED that the orders awarding pre-judgment interest
and denying treble damages, signed by the court on June 12, 1991
are both set aside.
-1-

PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs are awarded pre-judgment interest
at the rate of $1.91 per day from the date of the damages June 22,
1988 to the date of judgment.
TREBLE DAMAGES
The court recognized the wrongful entry in its Instruction
Number 16, which states:
Defendant's acts in cutting or causing to be cut Plaintiffs1 lock on the door and removing all items of personal property of Plaintiffs were wrongful.
The court finds however that because Plaintiffs did not have
an endorsement by the court upon the summons stating the number of
days within which the Defendant shall be required to appear and
defend the action, which shall not be less than three or more than
twenty days from date of service, as required by 78-36-8 UCA 1953,
that this cannot be deemed to be an action under the Forcible Entry
and Detainer statute.
The motion to treble damages is therefor denied.
The court makes the express determination that there is no
just reason for delay and the court expressly directs entry of
judgment on these orders.
Dated this

o£

day of July, 1991.

A.

John A. Rokich, Judge
" CEqilPY THAT TMIQ i - A ,r C0PY
DOCUJST C N ? S

OniG,NAL
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°UTT COURT n.pn'"

Oh X

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
It is hereby certified that a copy of the foregoing ORDER
AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST AND DENYING TREBLE DAMAGES was hand
delivered to Defendant's counsel, Charles W. Hanna, SMITH & HANNA,
311 South State Street, Suite #450, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on
this JAJ

day of July, 1991.

AM6L*~JT7^)
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Thirc" Jud.cial District

JUL 2 6 1991

John W. Lowe, No. 2001
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1624 Orchard Drive
P. O. Box 520003
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-0003
Telephone: (801) 486-5287

By

Jrr&Vtcabc.i >JZ„ .,
D&puiy Cl«f K

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES N. FOWLER and
SHERRIL FOWLER,

J U D G M E N T

:

Plaintiffs,

£V£lSl%G

:

Civil No. 880906180CV

:

Judge John A. Rokich

TERRY R. SEITER,
Defendant.
This action came on for trial before the court and a jury,
Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge presiding, and the issues
having been duly tried and the jury having duly entered its verdict.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs James N. Fowler and
Sherril Fowler recover of the Defendant Terry R. Seiter the sum of
$7,000 together with pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per
annum from June 22, 1988 to date of judgment in the amount $1.91
per diem, which pre-judgment interest is in the amount of $2,154.48
which principal and pre-judgment interest are in the amount of
$9,154.48, together with interest from date of judgment at the rate
of 12% per annum as provided by law and their costs of action.

-1-

Inasmuch as an appeal is pending on the court's order denying
the trebling of damages, the amount of costs shall abide the final
determination of the cause.
Dated this

o?£ day of July, 1991-

/?(^J?LJJ
Clerk of the Court

I CERTIFY THAT THIS 18 A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH.
t

HATP. LA,,

'^Lfflt

lul—e. *& o~M»
DEPUTY COURT CLERK
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Excerpt From Appellant's Brief
Gerard v. Young
432 P2d 343 (Utah 1967)

5 U 2nd 251, 351 Pac 2nd 624
1 Pac. 2nd 24

INI THE SUPREME COURT
DF THE STATE OF UTAH

„..

, 108 Pac. 2nd 479
ing Company vs. Ernst, 291 Pac. 764

z5

Y LOUISE GERARD,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

5 Annotated
» Annotated

vs.

! Annotated

PRESTON L. YOUNG and
JJNICE YOUNG,
Defendants-Appellants.
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiff-Respondent
seeking to forfeit a lease for a term of years based on
Defendants-Appellants' alleged "payoffs" on pinball machines and punch boards. Delinquent rental is not an
issue.
This action has been treated as if in unlawful
detainer under 78-36-1, et seq., 1953 UCA, though not
pleaded. The pleading theory of plaintiff is that a lease
provision has been violated by defendants and the lease
should be rescinded, (R2, Paragraph 6).

0)

a

2
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

H
id

1. Complaint for lease cancellation and for restitu-j
tion of the leasehold was filed June 13, 1966 (R. 1 JoTime for answer was shortened to three days, arranged
ex parte, with no reference to statutory authority, if any,^
to do it (R. 1, 2, 3). 78-36-8, 1953 UCA seems to re-1
quire a rental delinquency in order for the court to
shorten time of answer.
i

I 7. Plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary judgement was supported by three affidavits alleging receipts
\pi "payoffs" at the leasehold premises, (R. 16, 17, 19).
^Defendants-appellants filed an affidavit in opposition to
'plaintiff's affidavits stating there was no acquaintance
vfith plaintiff's affiants and that defendants-appellants
;
)vere entitled to examine those persons under oath and
itest their veracity and interest in the subject of the litigation to overcome the self-serving nature and hearsay
characteristics in those affidavits submitted by plaintiff,
-(It. 23).

2. Answer was filed June 15, denying gambling;
or right to restitution of premises if there was gambling!

8. Both motions for summary judgment were argued
July 5, 1966.

The following hurried sequence of events took*
place:

3. Defendants-Appellants filed motion for summary"
judgment on June 15, 1966 (R. 12), noticed for argu-4
ment July 5, 1966 (R. 11).
f
4. Counsel for plaintiff-respondent obtained special
pretrial setting for 12 p.m., June 22, 1966, though
notice of readiness for trial was not filed by plaintiffs
until July 1,1966 (R. 22).
5. There was no judge for the special pretrial hearing on June122, 1966, so plaintiff continued it to Jur|e/
24, 1966. On June 24, the pretrial judge ordered a v
further pretrial to be held on September 30, 1966 and;
placed the case on the jury trial calendar'for October
26, 1966.
£
6. On July 30, 1966, plaintiff-respondent filed mo-r
tion fo? summary judgment, also to be heard on July 5j
1966 (R. 14).

-.<£, 9. Memorandum decision granting plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary judgment was issued by the
Jrial Court July 6, 1966 (R. 25).
^
10. On July 8, 1966 defendants-appellants made
motion for reconsideration of the memorandum decision (R..29), which was supported by further affidavit
of defendants-appellants stating that the affidavits pertaining to "payoffs" were, to the best knowledge and
jbelief of affiant, false (R. 26).
11. Based upon the motion to reconsider, with supporting affidavit, the Court ordered both parties' motions
*or summary judgment denied and ordered that the
^matter remain on the pretrial calendar for Fridky, September 30, 1966 and that Trial be held Wednesday,
October 26, 1966, as previously scheduled. The Court
,in the order of July 8, affirmatively found that there
were questions of fact to be determined at trial (R. 30).

H
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M
12. On July 13, again ex parte, plaintiffs counsel \
obtained a trial setting for July 19, 1966 (R. 34), despite the July 8 order that trial would be October 26,
1966 (R. 30).
13. On July 13, 1966, defendants-appellants filed ;
objection to the July 19 trial setting (R. 33), noticing il
hearing on objection for July 18, 1966 (R. 31). Hearing ?
on the objection was had before the Honorable Albert i
H. Ellett, who refused to proceed with the matter since .
the special trial setting had been obtained before t h e |
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson. The court was on vacation on July 19, 1966, with no reporter and no jury*
was on hand, despite defendants-appellants demand for
jury having been filed and a jury fee having been paid f
(R. 32).
\
i
Trial was not held July 19, 1966, though plaintiff's *
counsel offered to obtain a court reporter and pay for
him. Plaintiff's counsel was not, however, successful in |
persuading the clerk of the court to summons a jury, in
the face of appellant's objection.
14. July 19, 1966, defendants-appellants filed petition to the Supreme Court of Utah for an interlocutory;
appeal, which was denied by the court in Case 10692,
July 27, 1966.
,
15. Under date of July 19, 1966, plaintiff-respond-,
ent noticed the taking of defendant's deposition for July/
26, 1966. Notice was filed with the Court July 27, 1966^
(R.34).
/
16. The deposition of defendant, Preston L. Young, $
was taken July 29, 1966 (R. 60). He refused to answer4*

questions concerning pinballs and punch boards based m
> on the self-incrimination provisions of the 5th amend- M
*w
ment to the United States Constitution.
17. Under date of July 21, 1966 plaintiff-respondent again filed motion for summary judgment based
upon previous allegations and affidavits set forth in the
. first motion for summary judgment heard on July 5,
1966. The motion was filed July 27. (R. 36).
18. The same matter having already been argued
and ruled on by the Trial Court, was again heard and
agrued on August 9, 1966.
19. On August 9, 1966, the day of the second argument, the Trial Court made and entered its order granting plaintiff-respondent's latest motion for summary
judgment, from which order this appeal is taken.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
1. Defendants-appellants seek decision that having
pinballs and punch boards on cafe premises, even if
"payoffs" are made, is not sufficient grounds to found
an action in unlawful detainer.
2. Appellants seek ruling that if there were "payoffs" on pinball machines and punch boards then the
Utah gambling statutes are unconstitutional and such
| conduct is not unlawful.
3. In the alternative, appellants seek ruling that the
issue of gambling be decided by a jury; and that gambling, if any, as an "unlawful business" under 78-36-3(4),
U953 UCA, or as a "material breach" of lease be determined by a jury these questions being issues of fact,
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not properly ruled on as a matter of law by the Trial
Court.
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Excerpt From Respondent's Brief
Gerard v. Young
432 P2d 343 (Utah 1967)
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As to the second point, 78-36-3, UCA, 1953, provides:
"UNLAWFUL DETAINER BY TENANT FOB TERM
LESS THAN LIFE. — A Tenant of real property, for

a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(4) When he assigns or sublets the leased
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or
commits or permits waste thereon, or when he
sets up or carries on therein or thereon any tinslawful business, or when he suffers, permits or
maintains on or about said premises any nuisance,
and remains in possession after service upon him
of a three days* notice to quit; or,
(5) When he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other
than those hereinbefore mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of such conditions or covenant or the
surrender of the property, served upon him, and,
if there is a subtenant in actual occupation of
the premises, also upon such subtenant, shall remain uncomplied with for five days after service
thereof. Within three days after the service of the
notice the tenant, or any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the
9

J
c
*j

c
§
g

term, or other person interested in its continuance, *
may perform such condition or covenant and*
thereby save the lease from forfeiture; provided,
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be per-^
formed, then no notice as last prescribed herein
need be given/' (Emphasis added)
It should be noted that while the unlawful detainer,
statutes have a number of precise (conditions concerning
due notice, that defendants have stated no point denying
proper notice at any point in the proceedings before the
trial Court or this court.
Is the gambling of sufficient substance to justify^
lease terminationt The facts show a continuous course"
of gambling. While the affidavits of the Hansons (R. 17-^
19) relate only isolated instances, the Complaint charges >
a course of gambling and of maintaining machines for,
that purpose at the cafe, as does the affidavit of Evan
Holladay (R. 16). As stated in Point I, these allega-f
tions not having been denied are deemed admitted.

•'The violation of a condition in the lease cannot
be said to be trivial when the violation is of such
a character that the lessor may be subjected to a
criminal prosecution therefore."
Finally, 78-36-3(5) UCA, 1953, makes no distinction
between great and small breaches of a lease, nor is there
a Utah case on this point. To satisfy this statute what is
required is only that a breach be proved and that after
notice given pursuant to the statute, that the breach continue. On this there is no argument on the facts as
Widenced by the unrebutted affidavits of Bryant and
Larry A. Hanson as to payoffs, on May 21, 1966, and
%ne 3, 1966 (R. 17-19), with notice under 78-3-36(4)&
(5) UCA, 1953, previously served on April 12, 1966
j(R. 4, 5). Gilbert v. Peck, 121 P. 315 (Calif.); 32 Am.
'Jur., Landlord and Tenant, §864, pp. 731; 100 ALR 2d
469 et seq.
CONCLUSION
*J

The gambling is substantial when viewed from plaint
tiff s eyes because, as lessor, she herself is liable to crimi*
nal prosecution if she allows gambling on the premise^
she has leased. 76-27-3 UCA, 1953, and 4-10-2, Salt Lake'
County Ordinances, Revised, 1953. The defendants haifr
ing refused to desist, she has the duty of forcing them to,
which this lawsuit hopes to do. The rule is stated '
Zotalis v. Catmellos et al, 164 NW 807 (Minn.), which
held shaking dice for cigars was grounds for lease ter
mination based on a lease term against gambling:
9

It is respectfully submitted that the summary judgent is well supported by the facts and law and should
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

/

£'#Mte

K. SAMUEL KING
Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respdndent
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Excerpt From Cross-Appellants Brief
Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc.
558 P2d 1317 (Utah 1976)

.graph 20 of the lease presently before the Court.

These

ces informed the appellant that the respondents elected
eclare a forfeiture of the lease upon the failure of
llant to cure the defects and that appellant would, in
event of such a failure, become a tenant at will.

They

Id be approved and confirmed in all respects.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO TREBLE
GES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, §78-36-10.
The appellant admitted service of respondents1
er dated September 24, 1974, directing that certain
irs be undertaken within 30 days or the lease-would be
eited (Amended Complaint para. 18 and Amended Answer
. 17); admitted service of respondentsf notice dated
nary 12, 1975 (Amended Complaint para. 21 and 22,
led Answer para. 20 and 21) ; and admitted his refusal to
te the premises pursuant to said notice (Amended Complaint
. 23, Amended Answer para. 22) . The trial court found
the indicated repairs and maintenance had not been
Leted (Findings of Fact NoV..^ 34 and 35 and Memorandum
sion at 5-6), found damages to be $4,000 (Finding of

- 39 -

Fact No. 39 and Memorandum Decision at 6 ) , found appellantfs
failure to vacate wrongful and anN unlawful holdover (Finding
of Fact No. 56 and Memorandum Decision at 6-7) , and found
damages in the nature of rent after forfeiture to be $900
per month (Finding of Fact No. 57 and Memorandum Decision at
7).
The trial court considered but refused to find
treble damages for the wrongful and unlawful holdover (Finding of Fact No. 59 and Memorandum Decision at 7) . The
respondents believe this finding of the trial court is
incorrect.

Utah Code Annotated 1953, §78-36-10 states in

part
. . . judgment shall be rendered against the
defendant guilty of the forcible entry, or forcible or
unlawful detainer, for rent and for three times the
amount of damages thus assessed.
This is the exact same language which the court
had occasion to review in Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 292
P. 206, 213 (1930).

The court states

This language has been held to require the entry
of judgment for three times the amount of damages,
after a finding of damages by the [court]. Eccles v.
Union Pacific-Coal Co., 15 Utah, 14, 48 P. 148. That
action was one for forcible and unlawful detainer, but
the statute applies as well to unlawful detainer. The
statute as construed in Eccles v. U. P. Coal Co.,
supra, makes it mandatory upon the court to render

judgment for three times the amount of damages thus
assessed. Id. at 214.
The court goes on to define what is meant by the term "damages"
which are trebled.

The appellant correctly points out to

the Court that such damages must be the natural and proximate consequence of the unlawful detainer (Brief of Appellant at 17) , but he failed to point out to the Court what
those consequences were.

The court in Forrester said

The damages which may be recovered in an action
such as this are measured by the rule that they must be
the natural and proximate consequences of the acts
complained of and nothing more. Rents and profits, or
rental value of the premises, during detention are
included in damages, (emphasis added), IcL. at 211.
The second claim for relief in respondentsf Amended
Complaint deals strictly with the fact appellant" refused to
vacate the premises as directed.

It is the unlawful deten-

tion of the premises which triggers the measure of damages.
The court stated
Clearly the loss of the value of the use and
occupation of the premises, or the rental value thereof,
during the period when the premises were unlawfully
withheld from plaintiff, is a damage suffered by her.
While damages may not be restricted to the rental value
and may include more, yet the rental value during the
unlawful withholding of possession is the minimum of
damages. Id. at 214.
In this case, appellant was in unlawful detention
from and after five days of service of respondentsf notice
- 41 -

on his legal counsel, or at the latest March 4, 1975.

This

unlawful detainer continued through January 15, 1976, when
\

the sheriff served the Writ of Possession placing respondents
in possession of the premises.
So there would be no misunderstanding regarding
damages, the court went on to distinquish

,f

rents which

accrued before forfeiture11 from "damages accruing after
forfeiture11 based on the rental value of the unlawfully
detained premises. It stated
Rents, which may not be trebled, are such as
accrue before termination of the tenancy. After the
tenancy has been terminated by notice required by
statute, the person in unlawful possession is not owing
rent under the contract, but must respond in damages
pursuant to law. Rental value or reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the premises becomes an
element of damages for retaining possession. This is
not rent, it is damages. Id. at 214.
Respondents have suffered additional damages as a
natural and proximate result of appellantfs unlawful holdover
in that the condition of the premises continued to decline.
The building exterior was not painted and the bare wood
continued to weather, the public restroom and kitchen floors
were not repaired, the kitchen walls continued to deteriorate
from the moisture put out by the ice machine as a result of
appellant's refusal to relocate it, and the blocked off
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restrooms continued to be exposed to the effects of inclement
weather.

Respondents were unable to correct these deficiencies

as a result of appellant's refusal to vacate and had no opportunity so to do prior to January 15, 1975.
The portion of the trial courtfs Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Decree denying treble
damages for unlawful -detainer should be reversed and the
matter remanded to the trial court for the entry of appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment
and Decree awarding respondents the treble damages to which
they were properly entitled.

The respondents should be

awarded their costs and a reasonable attorneyfs fee in conjunction with this appeal.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted:
(a)

The trial court erred as a matter of law

in not concluding that the lease renewal option was void
for vagueness and uncertainty.
(b)

The trial court erred as a matter of law

in not awarding treble damages for unlawful detainer.
(c)

In all other respects, the trial court's
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Excerpt Prom Appellant's Brief
Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc.
558 P2d 1317 (Utah 1976)

16

All of these cases involve a renewal option
with rentals to be renegotiated by agreement of the
parties.

None of the cases had the benefit of having

specified factors to be used in considering the basis for
the rental negotiation.

As was stated in Hall v.

Weatherford, 32 Ariz. 370, 259 P. 282, options to renew
granted to the lessee are obviously for his benefit and/
it is presumed/ are part of the consideration which induced
him to execute the lease.
It has also been held that where an agreement to
renew contained in a lease is independent from other
covenants such as to keep the premises in repair, it does
not release the lessor from his obligation to renew or
extend/ even if the covenant to keep premises in repair is
breached.

See Parsons v. Ball/ 205 Ky. 793/ 266 S. W. 649.

Therefore, the respondents could not use their complaints
concerning maintenance of the premises as grounds for
failure to reasonably renegotiate the new rentals.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT AWARDINGTREBLE DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS.
The respondents/ in the statement of points in
their-cross-appeal—have- stated-thatr 1:he-lower~^ourt

^AlianHq

RHef

vi ncrree
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errored iir concluding that they were not entitled to\
N

\

treble damages pursuant to*Utah Code Annotated/- 1952>
78-J6-10.
First/' the Notice to vacate is deficient on
its face in not .requiring, in the alternative, the
performance of the conditions of which they complain
or surrender of the property.
Second, respondents' Notice to vacate was only .premised upon appellant's failure'to make certain, repairs.
That would be the only claim which would be within the
provisions of the unlawful detainer statute.

The appellant

had continued to pay the monthly rentals of $500.00 per
month and was not. in an unlawful detainer situation by
refusing to pay the higher^rental demanded by respondents.
There has never been any claim by respondents
that appellant was unlawfully detaining the premises by
h i ^ failure to pay the increased rentals as. demanded.
It has been held that the damages which are
comtemplated-by the treble damages provision of the
statute must be the natural and proximate consequences
of th&-unlawful detainer and nothing more.
^Cooky 77 U. 137, 292 F.

See Forrester v.

206.

Since .the respondents' claim under the unlawful

18

detainer statute is based upon allegations of disrepair,
they must show that additional damages occurred as a
\

result of appellantfs failure to remove himself from the
premises.

This was not done.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the damages awarded for

delayed maintenance were excessive in light of the
evidence and many of them should have been awarded against
the defendant, the Continental Group of Utah, Inc.
The Court failed to consider the factors
specified in the Lease in determining increased rentals
for the renewal period and errored in holding that the
rentals should have been $900.00 per month.
Treble damages are not applicable to the
facts of this case since there is no evidence to show
that respondents were damaged by appellant's holdover
in the specific area of delayed maintenance.
Respectfully submitted,
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